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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Clarence Moore, who was convicted of rape and robbery 
and sentenced as a persistent offender to life imprisonment 
with twenty-five years of parole ineligibility, appeals from 
the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. S 2254. The principal issue at trial was the 
identity of the rapist. The principal evidence was the 
victim's post-hypnotic identification. The state prosecutor 
made certain improper arguments during jury summation 
which were addressed by the trial judge with curative 
instructions. The issue on appeal is whether these improper 
arguments deprived Moore of his right to a fair trial. 
 
I. 
 
On March 5, 1987, a jury convicted Moor e of second- 
degree burglary, second-degree r obbery, robbery with intent 
to commit aggravated sexual assault, and thr ee counts of 
aggravated sexual assault. These essential facts wer e 
established at Moore's trial. 
 
       On January 14, 1986, some time after 1:20 a.m., 25- 
       year-old M.A. was viciously assaulted by a man in the 
       bedroom of her cottage in Somers Point. M.A. went to 
       bed that night only to be awakened by a male who 
       grabbed her by the neck. The male demanded money, 
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       and M.A. removed $8 from her purse and gave it to 
       him. When M.A. could produce no more money, the 
       man became angry. He ordered her to undr ess. Despite 
       the man's assurance she would not be hurt if she did 
       as she was told, the man penetrated her anally after 
       she complied with his directions to roll over on her 
       stomach and then kneel on her hands and knees. The 
       man then ordered her to roll over and he penetrated 
       her vaginally. He then forced her to per form fellatio on 
       him until he ejaculated. Still angered by lack of money, 
       the man forced her to again perfor m oral sex until he 
       achieved an erection. He then order ed her to kneel on 
       the bed and "shake" her rear in the air while someone 
       outside watched. He warned her if she did not do this 
       "he would come back and do it again or kill" her. M.A. 
       remained in her bed for four hours fear ful the man was 
       still in the house. 
 
       Finally, she arranged to have the police called and, 
       when the police arrived, M.A. described her attacker . 
       She described him as a black male, about 5'8" to 5'10" 
       tall, late twenties to early thirties, very muscular and 
       strong. . . . She also said her attacker had been 
       wearing blue jeans. Further, she described him as 
       having some facial hair on the sides of his face. 
 
       While the bedroom was dark, there was enough outside 
       light "to see a face." Also, although she was not 
       wearing her contact lenses that corrected her 
       nearsightedness, she stated the attacker was "very 
       close" to her, close enough for her to see him and his 
       face . . . . However, M.A. testified she could see without 
       her contacts, that she had driven without them, and 
       her vision did not prevent her from seeing things close 
       to her. 
 
       When M.A. could not give the police composite artist 
       sufficient information to develop a composite sketch, 
       she suggested hypnosis, thinking it "might help[her] 
       remember, in more detail, his face." With the aid of 
       hypnotically enhanced memory, she could vividly r ecall 
       her attacker's facial features. She ther eafter was able 
       to positively identify the defendant as her assailant 
       both in court and on three occasions in out-of-court 
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       photographic arrays. She described the hypnotic 
       enhancement as making her attacker's face "much 
       clearer" with "the features . . . more detailed." She also 
       testified she initially could not positively r ecognize her 
       assailant without the hypnosis. There is nothing in the 
       record to suggest either the police or the doctor 
       assisting the hypnosis in any way suggested what the 
       assailant might look like. 
 
       As a result of the hypnosis, M.A. also r ecalled her 
       assailant wore a tan suede jacket with dirt ar ound the 
       pockets. A subsequently executed search warrant at 
       defendant's residence turned up a tan suede sweater 
       jacket with pockets along with several pairs of blue 
       jeans. 
 
State v. Moore, 641 A.2d 268, 270-71 (N.J. App. Div. 1994) 
("Moore II") (alterations in original). At trial, M.A., a 
Caucasian woman, testified and identified the jacket as the 
one worn by her attacker. 
 
A portion of the trial consisted of expert testimony on 
hypnosis.1 The State's witness, Dr. Samuel Babcock, 
justified his methodology and maintained that M.A.'s 
memory was enhanced through hypnosis.2 Defense witness 
Dr. William A. Miller testified about the shortcomings of 
using hypnosis to enhance a victim's memory. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Under New Jersey law, "testimony enhanced through hypnosis is 
admissible in a criminal trial if the trial courtfinds that the use of 
hypnosis in the particular case was reasonably likely to result in recall 
comparable in accuracy to normal human memory . . . . The trier of fact 
must then decide how much weight to accord the hypnotically refreshed 
testimony." State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (N.J. 1981). 
 
2. As required under State v. Hur d, a pre-trial hearing was held to 
determine the admissibility of M.A.'s testimony. 432 A.2d at 95. The 
Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling that the testimony 
was 
admissible, explaining that it was "satisfied the use of hypnosis was 
appropriate for the victim's fear-induced traumatic neurosis, . . . and 
that the trial judge's findings as to the pr ocedures employed and 
adherence to the Hurd requir ements were supported by substantial 
credible evidence in the record." Moore has not raised a federal 
constitutional challenge, in either state or federal court, to the 
admission 
at trial of M.A.'s post-hypnotic testimony. 
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Clarence Moore, an African-American male , did not 
testify. His wife Cheryl Moore, a Caucasian woman, testified 
on his behalf. Mrs. Moore testified that she and her 
husband lived about forty-five minutes from M.A.'s home. 
Although not recalling the night of the rape in particular, 
Mrs. Moore testified she would have noticed if her husband 
were missing for a period of two and a half to three hours 
in the early morning hours. She testified her baby suffered 
from a condition called "failure to thrive" which required 
frequent nursing and that Mr. Moor e assisted her in 
nursing the baby. Mrs. Moore also testified that at the time 
of the rape, she was suffering from mastitis, a type of 
breast infection. 
 
The state trial court observed, "[T]he only r eal question in 
this case is that of identity." There was no dispute that the 
victim was sexually assaulted and robbed, and the only 
"real question" for the jury was whether Moore was the 
culprit. As the trial court found, the answer tur ned on 
"whether or not the [hypnotically] enhanced or refreshed 
recollection [of the victim] [wa]s of sufficient reliable 
character and with such probative value that the jury 
should believe [the victim] beyond a r easonable doubt." 
 
The trial lasted more than two weeks and at the 
conclusion, both the defense and the prosecution delivered 
summations that lasted two to three hours. In his 
summation, the prosecutor sought to explain why Mrs. 
Moore's testimony buttressed the State's case stating, 
"Based on the testimony of Cheryl Moore, the case is 
stronger than ever, that the odds ar e that this defendant is 
the perpetrator [and] . . . you have mor e reason to convict 
Clarence McKinley Moore now that she has testified than 
ever." The prosecutor noted that ther e were in fact "three 
important things" that the jury should lear n from Mrs. 
Moore's "appearance" as a defense witness. 
 
       Here's where I ask you to really concentrate on my 
       words because if you misunderstand what I'm saying 
       right now, I am going to feel real bad and foolish, and 
       you are too. So let's all understand it like adults. 
 
       Race has nothing whatsoever to do with this case, 
       right? Right. We all know that the race of the people 
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       involved does not at all dictate whether he's guilty or 
       anything like that. I mean, let's hope that we all feel 
       that way, whether we are white or black or anything. 
       Okay? So let's clear the air that the statement that I'm 
       about to make has nothing whatsoever to do -- and I 
       hope this machine hears this-- has nothing whatsoever 
       to do with race. 
 
       This has to do with selection, okay? Here's what I 
       mean. All of us select people in life to be with based on 
       whatever reason, whether it's people to marry, whether 
       it's friends, whether it's people to associate with, 
       whether it's business people. We all make choices in 
       life that lead us to relationships with others, and those 
       choices may or may not be significant. 
 
       Let me show you what I mean. What if you as an 
       individual, whether you're male or a female, decide in 
       your life that you want to live your life with a blonde? 
       You know, you see all of these ads about blondes have 
       more fun and this and that and, again, whether you 
       are male or female or whatever--it can work both ways 
       --and so you become interested in being with blondes 
       because you prefer them. Right? Gentlemen pr efer 
       blondes. 
 
       Well, that can be seen, can't it, because maybe the 
       people that you choose to date or marry or be with all 
       appear to be blondes or it might be redheads or it 
       might be green hair. You know, nowadays I guess green 
       is one of the popular colors. It could be anything. You 
       could substitute any color hair or you could substitute 
       any particular trait. Right? It needn't even be color of 
       hair. It could be the color of eyes. It could be a person 
       who likes tall people. I think whoever I should be with 
       should be six foot four. It would make me feel terrific 
       to be with a woman six foot four, or vice versa, a 
       woman could think of a man like that. 
 
       You see my point? It's not a statement of race; it's a 
       question of choice, selection of who you might want to 
       be with, whether it is as a mate or a boyfriend or 
       girlfriend or victim. How about that? How about that 
       some people might choose a victim according to the 
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       way they look, whether they be blonde or blue or 
       anything else? 
 
       So I ask you this: What did we learn when we found 
       out that Cheryl Moore was the wife of the defendant? 
       I suggest to you in a nonracist way that what we found 
       out was that Clarence McKinley Moore made a choice 
       to be with a Caucasian woman -- 
 
Moore's counsel objected at that point and moved for a 
mistrial arguing the reference to race was irrelevant, 
inflammatory and prejudicial.3 The trial court denied the 
motion for a mistrial but admonished the prosecutor at 
sidebar not to refer to race.4 The court sustained the 
objection and instructed the jury: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. At sidebar, Moore's counsel ar gued, 
 
       Your honor, I'm going to ask for a mistrial because if there's no 
       reason that race should be brought into this thing at all, there's 
       nothing probative because of the fact that he's married to a white 
       woman that would suggest that he would then necessarily go out 
       and attack and assault a white woman. 
 
       That is precisely what [the prosecutor] is trying to infer here, 
that 
       because he's married to a white woman and because a white woman 
       has been assaulted, that that necessarily was the selection process 
       that went on in his mind because he couched the question in terms 
       of choice of victims. 
 
       There is absolutely no reason to inject race in this case. I stayed 
       away from it, and up until this point in time everybody stayed away 
       from it. The comments that were just elicited by [the prosecutor], 
it's 
       only done for one purpose entirely, and that's to inflame this jury 
       and to improperly put before them the fact of race as an issue in 
       terms of how this defendant, if in fact he was the perpetrator, 
       selected the victim. 
 
       There was no testimony as to that. Ther e was no testimony that he 
       has assaulted other white victims before or anything of that 
nature, 
       and all of the sudden, only because his wife is white, [the 
       prosecutor] is now trying to infer to this jury that this is a 
selection, 
       that that is something probative that they can use in making a 
       determination, and I mean, it has no part in this trial. It is 
highly 
       prejudicial, has no purpose for being other than the purpose that 
       [the prosecutor] is trying to do, an impr oper inference to this 
jury, 
       and I would ask the court to declare a mistrial. 
4. At sidebar, the trial judge stated: 
 
       I will instruct this jury that they are not to consider for any 
purpose 
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       Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am ordering you to 
       disregard what the prosecutor said in reference to the 
       testimony, the appearance of Mrs. Moore, she being a 
       white person, a Caucasian, and Mr. Moor e being a 
       black person, and that the reason, the selective 
       process, was that he did this aggravated assault 
       because he selected a white or Caucasian person. 
       Disregard that. That's an unfair and unr easonable 
       inference to be drawn from the testimony and I'm 
       convinced that it's not proper argument to the jury. 
 
The prosecutor then argued: 
 
       I say to you that there are two other r easons why you 
       should find that the State's case gets str onger with the 
       testimony of Cheryl Moore. We lear ned that on 
       December 4, 1985, the defendant's wife gives birth to 
       a child. She further tells you that from that time on up 
       until the time he's arrested, she's disabled. I mean, she 
       has bleeding breasts. 
 
       I ask you to consider that and infer that that would 
       give believability to the fact that during that period of 
       time, that is, on January 14, 1986, right in the middle 
       of the time after the birth of the child and the disability 
       of the wife, I ask you to infer that that is a period of 
       time when this individual would have his greatest need 
       for sexual release. 
 
Moore's counsel objected and renewed his motion for a 
mistrial. He noted that there was no evidence in the record 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       any suggestion of any racial impropriety, they are not to decide 
this 
       matter on prejudice, bias or . . . anything to do with race. I am 
also 
       going to tell this jury to disregard that argument and I'm going to 
       tell the prosecutor that you are not to r efer to that area. 
 
       I am convinced that summation is to argue the facts that were 
       adduced from the witness stand. I am also convinced that it is not 
       a reasonable inference to draw from the fact that this defendant is 
       married to a white women that he selectively made that decision to 
       rape or rob, [and] . . . sexual[ly] assault, a white woman. I don't 
       think that's a reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
       selective process, and I'm going to so instruct the jury. 
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"to even suggest that [Moore] couldn't have had sexual 
relations with" his wife during the period of time in 
question. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, 
and repeated its warning to the pr osecutor "to stay away 
from the area of white/black because I don't think that's in 
the case."5 The court sustained the objection to the 
inference and instructed the jury: 
 
       Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm going to or der 
       you to disregard that last statement of the prosecutor. 
       I don't believe a reasonable inference can be drawn in 
       that vein, that because there was not access--and I'm 
       not even sure there was--but because Mrs. Moore 
       testified that she had this mastitis, that that would 
       give the defendant that impetus to do something. 
       That's an improper inference. You are to disregard 
       that. 
 
Undeterred, the prosecutor concluded with a third 
improper remark6 to the jury: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. At sidebar, the trial judge stated: 
 
       I want you to stay away from the areas of white/black because I 
       don't think that's in the case; two, the reason that he could 
possibly 
       rape some woman because of the wife or anything dealing with the 
       reason the wife-which would give reason fr om him to do something 
       because he was unable to satisfy his needs at home or anything in 
       that vein. I don't think it's part of this case. 
 
6. Prior to this third remark, the pr osecutor told the jury that M.A. had 
been victimized beyond her rape by the investigative and trial process. 
Defense counsel objected to this comment and also objected to a 
perceived implication that Moore did not testify in his defense. After 
another sidebar conference, the trial judge issued the following curative 
instruction: 
 
       Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there has been some reference to 
       the fact that [the defendant] only called two defense witnesses. I 
       want to tell you -- and I'll tell you in the general context of my 
       charge later on -- that the defendant is under an obligation to do 
       nothing. The defendant need not call any witnesses. 
 
       I indicated that to you earlier on when we first got here. The 
       defendant can stand mute and not say anything and you are not to 
       take any unreasonable -- any inference from that at all. 
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       The last thing I have to say is that if you don't believe 
       [M.A.] and you think she's lying, then you've probably 
       perpetrated a worse assault on her. 
 
The court dismissed the jury for the day, advising 
counsel it would charge the jury the next mor ning. 
Immediately thereafter, Moore's counsel raised an objection 
and renewed his motion for a mistrial, ar guing the 
comment regarding "perpetrating a worse assault" on M.A., 
particularly when viewed in connection with the 
prosecutor's earlier comments, requir ed a mistrial. 
 
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, 
explaining the comment about "perpetrating a worse 
assault" on M.A. was "tangentially dealing with credibility." 
But the court informed counsel that, "in or der to insure 
fairness," it would nevertheless instruct the jury to 
disregard the remark. The court issued the following 
instruction the next morning: 
 
       Before I [charge you], I want to tell you I'm going to 
       order you--I generally don't order people. I'm going to 
       order you to disregard that last r emark made by [the 
       prosecutor] to the effect that the last thing I have to 
       say to you is that if you don't believe her and you think 
       she's lying, then you're probably perpetrating a worse 
       assault on her. 
 
       Disregard that remark. I have deter mined that's 
       improper and you are not to consider that for any 
       purpose in this case. 
 
The court charged the jury without objection. The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the 
trial court granted the State's motion to tr eat Moore as a 
"persistent offender," and imposed an extended term of life 
imprisonment with twenty- five years of par ole ineligibility. 
See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:44-3a (W est 2001). Moore's 
sentence was predicated on a 1968 conviction for carnal 
abuse, eight convictions in 1970 for burglary, and a 1976 
conviction for distribution and possession with the intent to 
distribute marijuana. These prior convictions, along with 
his immediate conviction for burglary, r obbery and three 
separate counts of aggravated sexual assault, placed him 
under New Jersey's persistent offender category. State v. 
 
                                10 
  
Moore, A-1910-87Ta, slip op. at *7-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. April 1, 1991) ("Moore I"). 
 
On direct appeal to the Appellate Division, Moore, now 
represented by the public defender , claimed among other 
things, that "the prosecutor's summation exceeded the 
bounds of propriety making it impossible for the defendant 
to receive a fair trial." Id. at *2. In support, Moore cited the 
references in the state's summation about the "selection 
process," the "need for sexual release," and the remark 
about "perpetrating a worse assault on the victim." The 
Appellate Division rejected Moore's claim on the merits. 
Although it found the prosecutor's "outrageous conduct 
violated ethical principles" and "showed a disregard of the 
obligation of the prosecutor to play fair and see that justice 
is done," the Appellate Division ruled that, within the 
context of the trial, the trial judge's "for ceful" instructions 
to the jury cured the harm that was done. Id. at *4. Moore 
received new counsel from the public defender's office, and 
filed a petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court presenting his due process claim and additional 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court declined review, and denied Moore's motion 
for reconsideration. 
 
In 1992, still represented by the public defender who filed 
the petition for certification, Moore filed a motion for state 
post-conviction review claiming, inter alia , he was denied 
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal because counsel failed to raise due 
process claims resulting from the following allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct: (1) improper r eference to matters 
outside the evidence and stating his personal opinion on 
the veracity of witnesses and the defendant's guilt; (2) 
misstating the law and diluting the burden of proof by 
informing the jury that reasonable doubt meant "the odds 
are" the defendant did it; and (3) disparaging and ridiculing 
the defense and defense counsel. The trial court, without 
holding an evidentiary hearing, denied the petition as 
procedurally barred and without merit. On appeal, the 
Appellate Division highlighted some of the pr ocedural 
infirmities, but chose to reject Moor e's claim on the merits. 
The Appellate Division ruled that, even if Moor e's counsel 
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had properly raised every instance of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct on direct appeal, it would have concluded that 
Moore had a fair trial, and was not denied ef fective 
assistance of counsel. Moore II, 641 A.2d at 268. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court denied Moore's petition for 
certification. 
 
In April 1997, no longer represented by the public 
defender's office, Moore timely filed a counseled habeas 
corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey. He raised the 
following claim: 
 
       The deliberate and continuous misconduct by the 
       prosecutor which included racist rationales to justify 
       the conviction of the African-American petitioner of 
       raping a white woman, statements that reasonable 
       doubt meant that the `odds are' that the petitioner 
       committed the offense, statements that defense counsel 
       didn't care about justice and was only trying to `sell' 
       reasonable doubt and a warning to the jury that if they 
       acquit the petitioner they will have perpetrated an 
       assault upon the victim, worse than her rape, deprived 
       petitioner of his right to a fair trial.7  
 
After reviewing the record, and finding the prosecutor's 
conduct "offensive and unprofessional," the District Court 
held that "the Appellate Division's opinions on direct appeal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In this appeal we will only address Moor e's federal due process claim 
with respect to the instances of prosecutorial misconduct that he raised 
at each level of review before the New Jersey courts (i.e. the 
prosecutor's 
"selection" argument, the "sexual r elease" argument, and the comment 
regarding "perpetrating a worse assault on the victim"). The remaining 
factual predicates were not fairly pr esented to the New Jersey courts in 
support of his due process claim. Therefor e to the extent Moore seeks 
relief based on other allegations of pr osecutorial misconduct, these 
claims are unexhausted, and now procedurally defaulted. O'Sullivan v. 
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) ("Before a federal court may grant 
habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies 
in state court."); McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 
1999) (to "fairly present" a federal constitutional claim, a petitioner 
must 
present the claim's "factual and legal substance to the state courts in a 
manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted") 
(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 461 (1982)). 
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and on post-conviction relief clearly consider ed the weight 
of the evidence in evaluating Moore's claim." State v. Moore, 
No. 97-2087, slip op. at *17 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 1998) ("Moore 
III"). The District Court concluded it was not an 
"unreasonable application of clearly established federal law" 
for the Appellate Division to hold the evidence could 
support the jury's verdict and "the pr osecutor's conduct, 
considered within the context of the entir e trial -- including 
the judge's curative instructions, the evidence and the 
correct jury charge -- did not `infect the trial with 
unfairness.' " Id. at *18 (citing 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (as 
amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Ef fective Death Penalty 
Act)). The District Court noted, 
 
       Were I sitting as an Appellate Court judge on direct 
       review of the trial below, I might well have concluded 
       that the prosecutor's misconduct deprived Moor e of his 
       right to a fair trial. Congress, however , has imposed a 
       much more demanding standard of review on federal 
       habeas corpus courts. The Appellate Division 
       considered the issue presented to me on two occasions 
       and concluded that Moore was not denied a fair trial. 
       After a complete review of the trial recor d, I cannot 
       conclude that the state court's analyses wer e "an 
       unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
       law." 
 
Id. at *19. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(a) and granted a certificate of appealability under 28 
U.S.C. S 2253. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1291, 2253. Because the District Court r elied exclusively 
on the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing, our review of its decision is plenary. Hartey v. 
Vaughn, 186 F.3d 367, 371 (3d Cir . 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1138 (2000). 
 
III. 
 
A state prisoner's habeas corpus petition "shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 
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the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim-- (1) resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(d)(1). "[S]ection 2254(d) fir mly establishes the state 
court decision as the starting point in habeas r eview." 
Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F .3d 877, 885 (3d 
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 824 (1999). 
 
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-06 (2000), the 
Supreme Court held that "contrary to" and"unreasonable 
application of " have independent, if overlapping meanings. 
To hold a state court decision is "contrary to . . . clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States," a federal court mustfind the 
state court arrived "at a conclusion opposite to that reached 
by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law," or that the 
state court confronted facts "materially indistinguishable 
from a relevant Supreme Court pr ecedent" but arrived "at 
a result different from" that reached by the Supreme Court. 
Id. at 404-09. The Court explained that "a run-of-the-mill 
state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from our 
cases to the facts of a prisoner's case would notfit 
comfortably within S 2254(d)(1)'s `contrary to clause,' " but 
that, as an example, a state court decision applying a 
burden of proof other than that required by Supreme Court 
precedent would be contrary to clearly established federal 
law as determined by the Supreme Court. Id. at 406. 
 
Even if a state court judgment is not contrary to 
Supreme Court precedent, it may be an unr easonable 
application of that precedent. Id. at 407-08. To hold that a 
state court's decision is an unreasonable application of 
"clearly established Federal law, as deter mined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States," we mustfind that (1) 
the state court identified "the correct governing legal rule 
from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably 
applie[d] it to the facts" of the particular case, or (2) the 
state court unreasonably extended or failed to extend a 
legal principle from the Supreme Court's precedent. Id. at 
407. "[A] federal habeas court making the`unreasonable 
application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's 
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application of clearly established federal law was objectively 
unreasonable." Id. at 409. The federal court "may not issue 
the writ simply because that court concludes in its 
independent judgment that the relevant state court decision 
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 
incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 
unreasonable." Id. at 411. 
 
"[C]learly established Federal law, as deter mined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States" r efers to Supreme 
Court "holdings, as opposed to the dicta," as of the time of 
the relevant state court decision.8  Id. at 412. Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In determining whether a state court unr easonably failed to apply 
federal law, the Supreme Court instructed, 
 
       [T]he "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the 
       state court's application of clearly established federal law was 
       objectively unreasonable. The federal habeas court should not 
       transform the inquiry into a subjective one by resting its 
       determination instead on the simple fact that at least one of the 
       Nation's jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same 
       manner the state court did in the habeas petitioner's case. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       The term "unreasonable" is no doubt difficult to define. That said, 
it 
       is a common term in the legal world and, accor dingly, federal 
judges 
       are familiar with its meaning. For purposes of today's opinion, the 
       most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal 
       law is different from an incorr ect application of federal law. 
 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10 (emphasis in original). 
 
In interpreting the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
("AEDPA") in a different context we recently stated, "We find no 
indication that AEDPA eliminated the r ole of the lower federal courts in 
interpreting the effect of Supreme Court pronouncements." West v. 
Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 62 n.10 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing traditional 
retroactivity analysis in light of AEDPA). Similarly in Matteo, 171 F.3d 
890, we held, 
 
       [A]lthough AEDPA refers to "clearly established Federal law, `as 
       determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' " (citation 
       omitted), we do not believe federal habeas courts ar e precluded 
from 
       considering the decisions of the inferior federal courts when 
       evaluating whether the state court's application of the law was 
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Court precedent which would have been consider ed an "old 
rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is also 
"clearly established Federal law, as deter mined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States."9 Id. 
 
IV. 
 
With this standard of review in mind, we will examine 
Moore's claims that the prosecutor's summation deprived 
him of a fair trial. 
 
A. 
 
The conduct of the trial, including closing ar guments, is 
regulated under the sound discretion of the trial judge. 
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). But 
prosecutorial misconduct may "so infect[ ] the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process." Donnelly v. DeChristofor o, 416 U.S. 637, 643 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       reasonable. See O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 1998) 
       ("To the extent that inferior federal courts have decided factually 
       similar cases, reference to those decisions is appropriate in 
       assessing the reasonableness vel non of the state court's treatment 
       of the contested issue.") . . . . [I]n certain cases it may be 
       appropriate to consider the decisions of inferior federal courts as 
       helpful amplifications of Supreme Court pr ecedent. 
 
9. In Hameen v. State of Delaware, we recently applied the Supreme 
Court's Williams test. 212 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 
S.Ct. 
1365 (2001). In Hameen we determined the Delaware Supreme Court's 
application of a retroactive amendment to the state death penalty law 
was not a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution because it was not "contrary to" clearly established federal 
law. In coming to this determination we detailed at length the Supreme 
Court's ex post facto precedent and stated we"simply cannot find . . . 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Delawar e . . . contrary to any [of 
these cases]. . . . In the circumstances, if we found an ex post facto 
violation here, we surely would be unfaithful to our obligations under the 
AEDPA." Id. at 246. After reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence in this 
area we also determined there was"no basis to hold that the Delaware 
Court unreasonably applied the Supreme Court's ex post facto cases to 
the facts of this case or unreasonably r efused to extend ex post facto 
principles to this case." Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. 362). 
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(1974). Such misconduct must constitute a " `failure to 
observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very 
concept of justice.' " Id. at 642 (quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)). Where "specific 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved,[the Supreme] 
Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial 
conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them," id. at 
643, but the test remains the same. See Dar den v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 
U.S. 1036 (1986). 
 
In Donnelly, a first-degree mur der prosecution, the Court 
addressed an improper remark by a state prosecutor during 
jury summation. The trial court later gave the following 
curative instruction as part of the jury char ge: 
 
       Closing arguments are not evidence for your 
       consideration . . . . Now in his closing, the District 
       Attorney, I noted, made a statement: "I don't know 
       what they want you to do by way of a verdict. They 
       said they hope that you find him not guilty. I quite 
       frankly think that they hope you find him guilty of 
       something a little less than first-degree mur der." There 
       is no evidence of that whatsoever, of course, you are 
       instructed to disregard that statement made by the 
       District Attorney. Consider the case as though no such 
       statement was made. 
 
Id. at 641. 
 
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim for 
federal habeas relief, finding that an "examination of the 
entire proceeding" did not support the contention that the 
"prosecutor's remark . . . by itself so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process." Id. at 643. The Court noted that, although 
the prosecutor's statement was improper , it was not so 
prejudicial that its effect could not be mitigated by a 
curative instruction. Finding the trial court had issued a 
"strong" instruction, twice stating the prosecutor's 
arguments were not evidence and dir ecting the jury to 
disregard the offensive statement in particular, the Court 
held any prejudice had been cured. Id.  at 643-44. The 
Court further explained the prosecutor's comment was 
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"admittedly an ambiguous one," id. at 645, and the case 
was not one "in which the prosecutor's r emarks so 
prejudiced a specific right, such as the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, as to amount to a denial of 
that right." Id. at 643 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609 (1965)). 
 
In Darden, the prosecutor made several improper 
remarks during closing argument, including using defense 
counsel's term "animal" to refer to the defendant and 
making "several offensive comments r eflecting an emotional 
reaction to the case." 477 U.S. at 180 & nn. 9-12. The state 
jury convicted the defendant of murder and assault with 
intent to kill and recommended a death sentence. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's 
federal habeas petition. Although the Court found the 
closing "deserve[d] the condemnation it has received from 
every court to review it," id. at 179, the Court concluded 
that, when viewed in context, the comments "did not 
manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor . . . implicate 
other specific rights of the accused." Id.  at 182. The Court 
noted the trial court had "instructed the jur ors several 
times that their decision was to be made on the basis of the 
evidence alone, and that the arguments of counsel were not 
evidence." Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court found "[t]he 
weight of the evidence against petitioner was heavy; the 
overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence to 
support a finding of guilt on all charges, .. . reduced the 
likelihood that the jury's decision was influenced by the 
argument." Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
 
To the extent that we may discern, ther efore, Supreme 
Court precedent counsels that the reviewing court must 
examine the prosecutor's offensive actions in context and in 
light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of the 
conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the 
quantum of evidence against the defendant. Ther e are 
"some occurrences at trial [that] may be too clearly 
prejudicial for . . . a curative instruction to mitigate their 
effect."10 Donnelly , 416 U.S. at 644; cf. Bruton v. United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Other courts of appeals have set forth tests for determining whether 
prosecutorial misconduct violates a defendant's right to due process. 
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States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (admission of 
codefendant's inculpatory confession too prejudicial to be 
cured through jury instruction). In making this 
determination, Supreme Court precedent requires the 
reviewing court to weigh the prosecutor's conduct, the effect 
of the curative instructions and the strength of the 
evidence. Darden, 477 U.S. at 182; Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 
163. 
 
B. 
 
1. 
 
We now examine whether the Appellate Division's 
judgment was contrary to clearly established federal law as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or 
an unreasonable application of federal law as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Williams, 529 
U.S. at 404-09. The Supreme Court has noted that in 
addressing whether or not prosecutorial misconduct has 
denied a defendant of a fair trial, "the pr ocess of 
constitutional line drawing . . . is necessarily imprecise." 
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 645. Here, the New Jersey Appellate 
Division examined each of the prosecutor's challenged 
arguments and, although finding them impr oper, held that 
when examined in light of the entire trial and the trial 
court's curative instructions, Moore had not been deprived 
of a fair trial. This was the correct analysis under Supreme 
Court precedent. Darden, 477 U.S. at 183; Donnelly, 416 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
See, e.g., United States v. Melendez, 57 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(examining severity of misconduct, curative instructions and evidence); 
United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582, 585 (1st Cir. 1982) (looking at 
severity of conduct, whether it was purposeful, ef fect of curative 
instruction, and strength of evidence). Some courts have also discussed 
"incurable errors." See, e.g.,Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 356 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (granting habeas petition under pr e-AEDPA standard in part 
because prosecutor's remarks that defendant was a liar and her repeated 
references to the Fifth Amendment wer e incurable error under Donnelly). 
But under Williams, 529 U.S. 362, we must determine whether the 
reviewing courts unreasonably applied federal law as determined by the 
Supreme Court. 
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U.S. at 163. Furthermore, because we have found no 
Supreme Court cases with facts "materially 
indistinguishable" from those at hand, we hold the state 
court's decision was not contrary to clearly established 
federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-09. 
 
2. 
 
Whether the Appellate Division unreasonably failed to 
apply clearly established federal law as deter mined by the 
Supreme Court is a more difficult question. The Appellate 
Division twice concluded that there was sufficient evidence 
to support Moore's conviction. See Moor e I, slip op. at *11 
("In ruling on the motion for a new trial the trial judge 
made a careful analysis of the evidence with r espect to the 
ability of the victim to have seen and identify her assailant. 
An examination of the record fully substantiates his recital 
and satisfies us that the conviction is supported by 
substantial credible evidence . . . ."). Specifically addressing 
the credibility of M.A.'s post-hypnotic identification, the 
Appellate Division stated, "There is nothing in the record to 
suggest either the police or the doctor assisting the 
hypnosis in any way suggested what the assailant might 
look like." Moore II, 641 A.2d at 271. 
 
Addressing the prosecutorial misconduct claims in 
particular, the Appellate Division held,"An examination of 
the [prosecutor's] summation in its entir ety shows that the 
complained of comments represented a small portion of an 
extremely lengthy summation, are too br oadly characterized 
by defendant and were in each case promptly and 
appropriately dealt with by a forceful curative instruction." 
Moore I, slip op. at *4. As to the pr osecutor's argument that 
the jury should infer that Moore selected a white woman to 
rape because his wife is white, the Appellate Division 
explained that "the impropriety of the suggestion was 
forcefully expressed" by the trial judge when he told the 
prosecutor at sidebar that the inference was unreasonable. 
Id. The Appellate Division noted the trial judge"immediately 
gave a forceful and complete curative instruction which not 
only told the jury to disregard the pr osecutor's remarks but 
told them it was an unfair and unreasonable inference and 
an improper argument." Id. at *5. The court was "satisfied 
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that [the trial judge's action] prevented the prosecutor's 
statement from substantially prejudicing defendant's right 
to a fair trial." Id. 
 
As to the prosecutor's argument that Moor e committed 
the rape because he had his "greatest need for sexual 
release" while his wife was ill, the Appellate Division noted 
that the trial judge issued a "curative instruction in which 
he told the jury to disregard the pr osecutor's statement; 
that it was an unreasonable and improper inference." Id. at 
*5-6. The Appellate Division was "satisfied that any possible 
prejudice was fully removed by the trial judge's prompt 
action." Id. at *6. And as to the final remark-- that the jury 
would probably perpetrate a "worse assault" on M.A. if they 
failed to believe her testimony-- the Appellate Division 
noted that "[o]nce again the jury was instructed to 
disregard the comment, that it was impr oper." Id. at *6-7. 
The court was "satisfied the judge's action her e, as with the 
previous improprieties, prevented the prosecutor's 
statements from substantially prejudging the defendant." 
Id. at *7. 
 
In conclusion, the Appellate Division noted the following: 
 
       Although we are persuaded that the prosecutor's 
       comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, we 
       would be derelict if we did not express our disapproval 
       in the strongest terms. The summation showed a 
       disregard of the obligation of the pr osecutor to play fair 
       and see that justice is done. [citation omitted]. Our 
       role, however, is not to supervise or punish 
       prosecutorial misconduct. It is to examine the trial for 
       fairness. Fortunately, the judge, unlike the prosecutor, 
       was sensitive to the need for a fair trial and pr omptly 
       and forcefully delivered curative instructions to the 
       jury. 
 
Id. The Appellate Division noted its view that "the 
prosecutor's outrageous conduct violated ethical 
principles," and "urge[d] the Attorney General to bring the 
matter to the attention of the appropriate ethics body." Id. 
 
The State maintains the Appellate Division's judgment 
"cannot be seen as unjustified" or unr easonable under 
Donnelly and Darden. Br. for Appellee at 37. Although the 
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Appellate Division correctly identified the governing federal 
law for prosecutorial misconduct claims, see Darden, 477 
U.S. at 182; Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 644, the question is 
whether it failed to reasonably apply that law to the facts of 
this case. 
 
The sole issue at trial was the identity of the rapist. It is 
undisputed that M.A.'s initial description of her attacker 
was vague. The morning after the rape she told police that 
she had only seen him "from the light outside" her 
apartment which came from street lights on the road and 
from lights in a hospital parking lot half a block away. M.A. 
acknowledged at trial that she had her eyes closed most of 
the time during the attack and that she was "scar ed to 
death." She also testified that her attacker told her to keep 
her eyes closed and that he "kept telling me that he had a 
knife and if I didn't do what he said that he would hurt 
me." She noted that she only had a "very fleeting 
opportunity" to see her attacker, but at"one point when he 
was standing over the bed, I saw his face." M.A. stated he 
was "close enough to see, but not in detail." She stated that 
even though she was not wearing her contact lenses during 
the attack, her attacker was "very close" to her - close 
enough for her to see him and his face. She stated that she 
could see certain things without her contact lenses- that 
she had driven without them and that her vision did not 
prevent her from seeing things close to her. 
 
Although in her initial statement to police the day after 
the rape she stated her attacker "may have been black," in 
a written statement to police that same day she described 
her attacker as "black, about 5'10", 175 lbs., late 20's to 
mid 30's. Short hair, short beard close to his face. He was 
wearing blue jeans." She also stated, "Y ou could tell he was 
black" because of his "tough street talk." She described her 
attacker's build as "medium, muscular. Not bulky, just 
muscular." 
 
Because of her limited opportunity to view her attacker, 
M.A. suggested to police that she might be able to 
remember him in more detail if she wer e hypnotized. Three 
weeks after the rape, the Somers Point Police arranged an 
appointment with Dr. Samuel Babcock, a clinical 
psychologist, for M.A. to be hypnotized. Befor e the hypnotic 
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session with Dr. Babcock, M.A. had not identified Moore as 
her attacker. M.A. testified that the police did not show her 
photographs of potential suspects before the hypnotic 
session. In accordance with New Jersey law, Dr . Babcock 
taped his meeting with M.A. The transcript of his meeting 
was produced at trial and portions of the audio tape were 
played for the jury. Part of this evidence consisted of M.A.'s 
pre-hypnotic description to Dr. Babcock of her limited 
ability to see her attacker. She said, "There's not much 
[light], some, a little bit of light comes thr ough the window 
but there was no light in my house, no lights were on it's 
pretty dark." When asked how much light came through 
her window she stated, "Ah, not very much, its enough to 
see like shadows and stuff, but not . . . . Like outlines of 
things, you know, but uhm, nothing really you know, not 
like ahm, nothing in detail." In her pre-hypnotic interview 
with Dr. Babcock, she also stated that her attacker's face 
was "round, . . . he had a short bear d, meaning facial hair 
as though he hadn't shaved in a few days. He was about 
five-foot-eleven." 
 
After undergoing hypnosis, M.A. was able to r ecall that 
her attacker's skin color was "medium." She testified that 
"[w]hen I was hypnotized, I saw his face again just like I 
had seen it, but it was much clearer." Immediately after the 
hypnotic session, M.A. met with a state police sketch artist 
and described her attacker. The sketch artist testified that 
as a result of the hypnosis, M.A.'s memory was"definitely 
enhanced" and she was "surer of particular . . . information 
. . . . [S]he told me that she remember ed better." He said 
M.A. 
 
       described the person or the perpetrator of the crime as 
       being a Negro male, approximately twenty-eight years 
       old, approximately one hundred eighty pounds, 
       approximately five[-]foot[-]eleven, muscular build, 
       medium complexion. She remembered his eyes as 
       approximately being dark. She remember[ed] stubble 
       on his face and the hair as being black and short with 
       tight texture. 
 
In addition to recalling more specific features of her 
attacker during hypnosis, M.A. remember ed her attacker 
had worn jeans and a tan suede jacket with a zipper. 
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Several days later she also recalled ther e was dirt or a stain 
near one of the pockets of her attacker's jacket. 
 
With the assistance of M.A.'s "sketch," the police 
arranged a photo line-up of possible suspects that included 
a photograph of Clarence Moore. Police included Moore in 
this line-up because he was a suspect in two other sexual 
assault cases in Somers Point. Moore was also awaiting 
trial on sexual assault charges in Cape May County. 
 
M.A. immediately recognized the photograph of Clarence 
Moore during the photo line-up. But the two other sexual 
assault victims from Somers Point could not identify him. 
In a written statement to police following this photo line-up, 
M.A. stated, 
 
       On February 5, 1986, at 12:40 A.M., I was shown a 
       photo line-up consisting of six photographs of black 
       men by Capt. Lukasiewicz and Sgt. Kaufman. After 
       carefully viewing these photographs, I picked photo #2 
       [the photo of Clarence Moore] as the man who sexually 
       assaulted me. I am absolutely sure of this 
       identification. 
 
After this initial photo identification, the police executed 
a search warrant at Moore's home. They found a pair of 
jeans and a jacket with a suede front and "sweater 
material" on the collar, back and sleeves. The jacket had 
stains on the front. M.A. had not mentioned to police that 
her attacker's jacket had sweater material on the sleeves. 
Additionally, M.A. described the jacket as "tan," but a state 
police laboratory that conducted tests on the jacket said it 
contained "orange fibers." 
 
On October 9, 1986, almost nine months after the initial 
identification of Moore, M.A. again met with the Somers 
Point Police and the Atlantic County Prosecutor's office and 
was shown a series of different photographs of suspects 
including a more recent photograph of Clar ence Moore (the 
previous photograph had been taken two years earlier). The 
officers present at this viewing testified that M.A. 
immediately identified Clarence Moore as her attacker. After 
this identification, the officers showed M.A. a third series of 
photographs from a live line-up of suspects that were in a 
different order from the suspects in the previous 
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photographs. M.A. again identified Clarence Moore as her 
attacker. 
 
The investigating officers and those present during M.A.'s 
out of court identifications testified at trial. Defense counsel 
cross-examined these witnesses about the identification 
procedures. The officer who conducted the first photo line- 
up described the procedures he employed in selecting 
photographs for the identification stating, 
 
       I obtained five other photographs of people that 
       appeared similar in physical appearance [to Moore]. 
       With those I then photographed all six separately so 
       they would all be of the same general size and color 
       hue. I then placed them into a folder that has squar es 
       cut out so that only the face was showing. 
 
He also testified that he chose the photographs in the line- 
up by going through a large stack of photographs at the 
police station and that he "tried to pick out the pictures 
that most closely resembled Mr. Moor e." He testified that 
during the identification, M.A. immediately picked out 
Moore's photo and said, " `I'm sur e that's him. I'll never 
forget his face. I see it every time I close my eyes.' " 
 
Dr. Samuel Babcock testified at trial about the 
procedures he employed in hypnotizing M.A. During cross- 
examination, Dr. Babcock was questioned about his 
methodology, specifically whether his procedure relied on 
suggestive forms of questioning to enhance r ecall.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Defense counsel questioned Dr. Babcock about confabulation, where 
a person under hypnosis may unconsciously fill in memory gaps with 
suggested information. Defense counsel suggested that authorities 
within the scientific community believed the mor e assertive and 
dominant the hypnotist, the greater likelihood the hypnotized subject 
would experience confabulation. Defense counsel questioned Dr. 
Babcock about how assertive he was with his patients. He also 
questioned Dr. Babcock about the age r egression technique of hypnosis 
he employed in hypnotizing his clients, and whether he was aware that 
some authorities believed this technique resulted in a greater number of 
subjects experiencing confabulation. Dr. Babcock responded to these 
questions by acknowledging the scholarly criticism of suggestive 
questioning and its impact on confabulation. However , he stated, 
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At trial M.A. testified that when she was sexually 
assaulted she was able to look at the person who attacked 
her and was able to see his face. She stated she was able 
to see him "clearly," and that after being hypnotized, "I saw 
his face again just like I had seen it, but it was much 
clearer." In describing her identification of Moore at the 
initial photo line-up, M.A. testified, "As soon as I saw 
number two [Moore], I recognized him." In testifying about 
the second photo identification, M.A. said, "I immediately 
recognized the man who assaulted me." She testified that 
the other photographs in the line-up did not look very 
different from Moore but she knew Moore because "that is 
the same face that I saw that night. I recognize that face, 
everything about it." Finally, M.A. identified Moore during 
an in-court identification stating there was no question 
whatsoever in her mind that he was her attacker . 
 
The state recovered physical evidence, including various 
articles of clothing and blankets from M.A.'s apartment, 
and sent this evidence to a crime laboratory for DNA 
testing. The laboratory also examined hair, saliva and blood 
samples from both M.A. and Moore. After testing this 
material, the laboratory issued a report stating, "An 
insufficient amount of high molecular weight human DNA 
was isolated from the vaginal swabs, fitted sheet, beige 
blanket, yellow blanket and the light blue comforter 
therefore no comparisons could be made with blood from 
Clarence Moore." 
 
C. 
 
As noted, the quantum or weight of the evidence is 
crucial to determining whether the prosecutor's arguments 
during summation were so prejudicial as to result in a 
denial of due process. Darden, 477 U.S. at 182; Donnelly, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       I keep low key, I do not lead the person. I only ask them to 
continue 
       their own narrative, asking questions within their narrative but 
       without pressure. If I feel that they'r e not giving an answer, 
I'll back 
       off the question. Perhaps I may come back to it later, but I do not 
       do it in any kind of a pressure situation. 
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416 U.S. at 644. The Appellate Division analyzed the 
"incurability" of the prosecutor's r emarks within the context 
of the entire trial and specifically examined the weight of 
the evidence.12 Moore I, slip op. at *11; Moore II, 641 A.2d 
at 124. Although M.A.'s identification of Moor e was post- 
hypnotic, the New Jersey courts have validated this form of 
identification.13 The New Jersey courts reviewed this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. M.A.'s description of Moore as her attacker cannot be corroborated 
by other witnesses. But corroborating witnesses are usually unavailable 
in cases involving sexual assault. It is the duty of the fact finder to 
assess the credibility and reliability of the victim's testimony. Moore's 
attorney cross-examined M.A. on her identification and the jury found 
her identification reliable. The trial court and Appellate Division held, 
if 
the jury found M.A.'s identification reliable, there was sufficient 
evidence 
to sustain Moore's conviction. Moor e II, 641 A.2d at 124-25. 
 
13. As recently as 1996, the New Jersey Supr eme Court declined to 
adopt a per se rule prohibiting hypnotically induced testimony. State v. 
Fertig, 668 A.2d 1076, 1081-82 (N.J. 1996). The court reasoned that 
although many state courts prohibit hypnotically induced testimony, 
other courts have evaluated post-hypnotic testimony under a totality of 
the circumstances test or have consider ed other factors, including 
"procedural safeguards similar to those in Hurd to determine case-by- 
case whether hypnotically-refreshed testimony is admissible." Id. at 
1081. The court noted that twenty-six courts have found hypnotically 
refreshed testimony per se inadmissible while only four states, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee and Wyoming, find it generally admissible. 
The court also noted that the expert whose r ecommendations they relied 
upon in Hurd to determine the admissibility of hypnotically induced 
testimony now believes that "procedural safeguards cannot fully protect 
against the admission of [some improper] testimony . . . . [Therefore] 
hypnosis should not be used to prepare a witness to testify in court, . . 
. 
in an attempt to improve the recall of a previously unreliable or 
uncertain witness." Id. (quoting Martin T . Orne, et al., Hypnotically 
Induced Testimony in Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspective 
171, 205 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F . Loftus, eds. 1984)). But the New 
Jersey Supreme Court commented that many federal courts, including 
the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits, and several state courts, including courts in Alabama, 
Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Dakota and 
Wisconsin, determine on a case-by-case basis whether hypnotically 
refreshed testimony is sufficiently r eliable to be admissible. Id. at 
1081. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated, "These courts recognize, as we 
did in Hurd, that a per se inadmissible rule may exclude otherwise 
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evidence and found nothing in the recor d suggested that 
either the police or Dr. Babcock suggested what the 
assailant looked like. Moore I, slip op. at *10. The Appellate 
Division noted, 
 
       Following a thorough Hurd hearing, the trial judge 
       found that all the standards set forth by the[New 
       Jersey] Supreme Court had been fully complied with. 
       We are satisfied the use of hypnosis was appropriate 
       for the victim's fear-induced traumatic neur osis, and 
       that the trial judge's findings as to the pr ocedures 
       employed and adherence to the Hurd  requirements 
       were supported by substantial credible evidence in the 
       record. 
 
Id. 
 
The Appellate Division concluded the evidence was"more 
than sufficient" to support a finding of guilt. Moore I, slip 
op. at *11; Moore II, 641 A.2d at 124. But finding the 
evidence "more than sufficient" for conviction does not 
necessarily end the constitutional inquiry. Although the 
jury found Moore guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Supreme Court requires the reviewing court to factor the 
prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's improper remarks into 
the jury's finding of guilt and then assess its impact. 
Taking into consideration the quantum of evidence properly 
presented, the due process inquiry r equires the reviewing 
court to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks were 
so prejudicial, even in light of the curative instructions, as 
to result in the denial of the right to a fair trial. When the 
evidence is strong, and the curative instructions adequate, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
reliable evidence." Id. In Fertig, however the court added an additional 
procedural safeguard stating, "When trial courts admit hypnotically- 
refreshed testimony, they should instruct the jury of the effect that 
hypnosis may have on that testimony." Id. at 1082. 
 
In this case, the trial court conducted the appr opriate Hurd hearing to 
determine the admissibility of M.A.'s post-hypnotic identification and 
instructed the jury that they could consider this testimony if they found 
it reliable. Of course, Fertig's requirement that the jurors be instructed 
about the effect hypnosis may have on testimony was inapplicable at the 
time of Moore's trial. 
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the Supreme Court has held the prosecutor's prejudicial 
conduct does not deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Greer 
v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (holding evidence "primarily 
consisting of detailed testimony [of a co-conspirator who 
had confessed to the crime] which was corr oborated by 
physical and other testimonial evidence" was str ong enough 
to support conviction despite prejudicial comments), reh'g 
denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987); Darden , 477 U.S. at 182 
(holding "the weight of evidence against the[defendant] was 
heavy; the overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial 
evidence to support a finding of guilt on the char ges . . . 
reduced the likelihood that the jury's decision was 
influenced by the [prosecutor's] impr oper argument"). We 
must assess then the prosecutor's improper remarks, the 
curative instructions and the weight of the evidence. 
 
D. 
 
The prosecutor's challenged arguments at the very least 
were irrelevant, illogical and offensive. His "selection" 
argument appeared to be based on the per ception that rape 
is an expression of sexual desire rather than violence.14 In 
fact it is generally understood the opposite is true, 
Lieberman v. Washington, 128 F .3d 1085, 1098 (7th Cir. 
1997) (citing authorities), and the trial court advised the 
jury of the invalidity of the prosecutor's theory in its 
curative instruction. To the extent the pr osecutor's theory 
implicitly represented that a black man's attraction to a 
white woman is an identifying characteristic, the trial court 
countered it was "unfair and unreasonable" to infer that the 
selection of a white victim would help identify Moor e. The 
trial court also invalidated the prosecutor's"sexual release" 
argument by instructing the jury that the inference was 
unreasonable and improper and ther e was no evidence of 
lack of sexual access. 
 
The prosecutor's "selection" argument cited Moore's 
marriage to a white woman, arguably raising biases against 
miscegenation and ugly stereotypes. Racially or ethnically 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The State acknowledges, "The Appellate Division properly saw this 
remark as an ignorant and uninformed statement about the true nature 
of sexual assault." Br. for Appellees at 40. 
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based prosecutorial arguments have no place in our system 
of justice. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309-10, 
reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987). In this regard, courts 
applying Supreme Court precedent have found that 
improper racial and ethnic references can be so prejudicial 
as to result in a denial of due process. 15 But not all racial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We recognize there ar e instances where trial courts immediately 
grant a defendant's motion for mistrial because of a prosecutor's 
prejudicial comments. Typically a trial judge's grant of a defendant's 
motion for a mistrial is not reviewed on appeal, unless double jeopardy 
concerns are present. See generally United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 
(1976). Therefore, the following sampling of appellate cases may not 
accurately reflect the range of cases wher e a prosecutor's improper 
racial 
references constituted due process violations. We also note that some of 
the following cases predate Donnelly. But to the extent these cases 
examine the prejudicial effect of impr oper racial arguments we find them 
helpful in illustrating the curability of impr oper racial arguments. See, 
e.g., United States v. Cannon, 88 F .3d 1495, 1503 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(prosecutor's reference to African-American defendants as "bad people" 
in case where evidence was not overwhelming"gave [the] jury an 
improper and convenient hook on which to hang their conduct," 
resulting in due process violation); United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 
27- 
28 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's statement that "Jamaican[s] [are] . . . 
coming in and they're taking over" and r epeated references to "they" and 
"them" in a drug case involving Jamaican defendants was improper 
where evidence was not "overwhelming"); McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 
414, 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's statement that African- 
American officer's testimony about African-American defendant should 
be believed because it is "someone she knows and that's a member of 
her own race" was "constitutionally imper missible" because it invoked 
race for an illogical purpose and created "a distinct risk of stirring 
racially prejudiced attitudes"); Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 
125, 127 (6th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's statement that "not one white 
witness has been produced" to support African-American defendant's 
case was prejudicial and required new trial where evidence was not so 
overwhelming as to create an "open and shut case" against defendant); 
Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's 
statement that "I argue to you that the average white woman abhors 
anything of this type . . . with a black man" in a rape case involving 
African-American defendants was due process violation where no 
curative instructions were given); Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (prosecutor's asking jury to"[t]hink about the consequences 
of a letting a guilty man . . . go free. Because maybe the next time it 
won't be a little black girl from the other side of the tracks; maybe it 
will 
be somebody that you know," operated to deny African-American 
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and ethnic references are so pr ejudicial as to constitute due 
process violations. Darden, 477 U.S. at 182; Donnelly, 416 
U.S. at 644. In other instances, courts applying Supreme 
Court precedent have held the prejudicial effect of a 
prosecutor's improper references to race or ethnicity can be 
cured with judicial instructions charging the jury to 
disregard the improper statements. 16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
defendant accused of rape the right to fair trial when combined with two 
other inappropriate comments); United States ex rel. Haynes v. 
McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 155, 161 (2d Cir. 1973) (prosecutor's 
statements about defense counsel's "experience with the people of the 
colored race" and his knowledge of "their weaknesses and inability to do 
certain things that maybe are commonplace for the ordinary person to 
do," combined with his statement about "the custom and habit of many 
colored people" to have "exotic hair dos" denied African-American 
defendants fair trial where evidence in case was not "overwhelmingly 
persuasive"); United States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (6th Cir.) 
(prosecutor's statement about African-American defendant's African- 
American character witness "running around with a white go-go dancer" 
was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant new trial), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
967 (1970). 
 
16. The following is a sampling of federal cases applying Supreme Court 
precedent, see supra note 8, that have found improper prosecutorial 
references to race were not so pr ejudicial as to result in the denial of 
due 
process. Again, some of these cases predate Donnelly. But to the extent 
they illustrate the prejudicial effect of improper racial arguments, we 
find 
them helpful. See, e.g., Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 
1998) (prosecutor's statement that African-American defendant had prior 
arrests for sexual offenses with "young white women" was "too fleeting 
and isolated" to have denied defendant fair trial), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1123 (1999); Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(prosecutor's reference to African-American witness as "shucking and 
jiving on the stand" and reference to African-American defendants as 
"boys" did not interfere with the impartiality of the jurors because the 
"evidence of guilt in the case was overwhelming"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1123 (1996); Russell v. Collins, 944 F .2d 202, 204 n.1 (5th Cir.) 
(prosecutor's statement asking jury to imagine the fear of white murder 
victim as "three black strangers" attacked her was an "isolated reference 
to the race of the defendant" and did not deny defendant fair trial), 
cert. 
denied, 501 U.S. 1278 (1991); United States v. Chase, 838 F.2d 743, 750 
(5th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor's statement about "Colombians [sic] with their 
cautiousness" in a drug case involving Colombian defendant was not 
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In this case, the trial court commendably attempted to 
cure any possible harm and prejudice resulting from the 
prosecutor's improper arguments. After refuting the 
prosecutor's "selection" argument, the court specifically 
instructed the jury to disregard the pr osecutor's remarks, 
declaring that such racial references wer e invalid. As noted, 
the trial judge instructed the jury, 
 
       I am ordering you to disregard what the prosecutor 
       said in reference to the testimony, the appearance of 
       Mrs. Moore, she being a white person, a Caucasian, 
       and Mr. Moore being a black person, and that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"harmful error"); United Statesv. Cardenas, 778 F.2d 1127, 1131-32(5th 
Cir. 1985) (prosecutor's statement that defendant in a drug case was 
Colombian did not warrant a new trial); United States v. Harvey, 756 
F.2d 636, 649 (8th Cir.) (prosecutor's statement that attributed the use 
of the term "honky" to African-American defendant accused of crimes 
involving white victims was prejudicial but was cured by cautionary 
instructions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 831 (1985); Griffin v. Wainwright, 
760 F.2d 1505, 1513, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor's reference to 
victim of crime as "white" in case involving black defendant did not deny 
defendant fair trial), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986); United States 
v. 
Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir.) (prosecutor's statement that 
defendant in drug case was Colombian did not warrant new trial), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983); Thornton v. Beto, 470 F.2d 657, 659 (5th 
Cir.) (prosecutor's reference to African-American defendants as "niggers" 
during re-direct examination of victim did not deny defendants fair trial 
because defense counsel objected when remark was made and court 
instructed jury to disregard reference), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 
(1973); 
United States v. Horne, 423 F.2d 630, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(prosecutor's statement that "I am tir ed of [defense counsel] trying to 
let 
these people hide behind their race" and statement during closing that 
"[r]emember first, that he is a Negr o" was improper but did not affect 
African-American defendant's "substantial rights" when viewed in context 
of whole record); Brent v. White 
              , 398 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(prosecutor's reference to rape victim as "white girl" in case where 
defendant was African-American was not due pr ocess violation because 
victim took the stand as a witness and it was appar ent to jury she was 
white), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1123 (1969); United States v. Douglas, 862 
F. Supp. 521, 530-31 (D.D.C. 1994) (pr osecutor's reference to Jamaican 
defendant's ethnicity in drug case did not r esult in due process 
violation), aff 'd, 70 F.3d638 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1098 (1996). 
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       reason, the selective process, was that he did this 
       aggravated assault because he selected a white or 
       Caucasian person. Disregard that. That's an unfair and 
       unreasonable inference to be drawn fr om the testimony 
       and I'm convinced that it's not proper ar gument to the 
       jury. 
 
The Appellate Division held that in the context of the entire 
trial, these curative instructions remedied the harms 
caused by the prosecutor's improper comments.17 We are 
not convinced. The prosecutor's approach in advancing his 
"selection" argument was direct and deliberate. His own 
words demonstrate the purpose of his appeal was to bolster 
the State's identification evidence. Specifically he stated, 
 
       Based on the testimony of Cheryl Moore, the case is 
       stronger than ever, that the odds ar e that this 
       defendant is the perpetrator [and] . . . you have more 
       reason to convict Clarence McKinley Moor e now that 
       she has testified than ever. 
 
The prosecutor noted there were "three important things" 
the jury should learn from Mrs. Moor e's "appearance" as a 
defense witness. He stated: 
 
       What did we learn when we found out that Cheryl 
       Moore was the wife of the defendant? I suggest to you 
       in a nonracist way that what we found out was that 
       Clarence McKinley Moore made a choice to be with a 
       Caucasian woman. 
 
In other words, the prosecutor argued Moore's "preference" 
for white women was probative evidence of whether he 
raped M.A. His disclaimer, "It's not a statement of race; it's 
a question of choice," does not mitigate his injection of race 
into the jury's deliberations ("the case is str onger than 
ever"). The trial judge immediately understood the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See, e.g., Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8 ("We normally presume that a 
jury will follow an instruction to disregar d inadmissible evidence 
inadvertently presented to it, unless ther e is an `overwhelming 
probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's 
instructions.") (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 218 (1987)). 
Here, the prosecutor's improper ar guments were not inadvertently 
presented. 
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implications of the prosecutor's argument. Calling the 
argument "unfair," the trial judge recognized the 
prosecutor's "selection" argument was prejudicial because it 
declared that Mrs. Moore's race was r elevant to the issue of 
Moore's guilt and could play to bias against interracial 
couples. The argument gave the jury an illegitimate "hook" 
on which to base their decision.18 
 
The "selection" argument had no basis in the evidence. In 
a case involving a black defendant accused of raping a 
white woman we believe this argument, although presented 
with a disclaimer, was highly prejudicial and invited the 
jury to decide the case on bias. See Miller, 583 F.2d at 707 
(prosecutor's statement that "I argue to you that the 
average white woman abhors anything of this type . .. with 
a black man" in a rape case involving African-American 
defendant was due process violation wher e no curative 
instructions were given). As noted, the trial judge had little 
doubt about the argument's impact when he admonished 
the prosecutor at sidebar to "stay away fr om the area of 
white/black because I don't think that's in the case." 
 
The prosecutor's "sexual release" ar gument was also 
improper. The comment implied that Moor e was guilty of 
raping M.A. because he was unable to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife. While improper , we believe it is 
the kind of remark usually remedied by appropriate 
curative instructions. The trial judge immediately cautioned 
the jury that there was no evidentiary basis for this 
inference. We believe the trial judge ef fectively remedied any 
possible prejudice stemming from the r emark. 
 
As noted, the prosecutor commented at the end of his 
summation that, "if you don't believe . . . [M.A.] and you 
think she's lying, then you've probably perpetrated a worse 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 n.30 ("If the circumstances of 
a particular case indicate a significant likelihood that racial bias may 
influence a jury, the Constitution requir es questioning as to such 
bias.") 
(citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976)); Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1503 
(prosecutor's reference to African-American defendants as "bad people" 
in case where evidence against them was not overwhelming "gave [the] 
jury an improper and convenient hook on which to hang their conduct," 
resulting in due process violation). 
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assault on her." This was an improper appeal to the jurors' 
passions.19 As the Supreme Court held in Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 85-88 (1935), overruled on other 
grounds, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), 
 
       The United States Attorney is the repr esentative not of 
       an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
       whose obligation to govern impartially is . . . 
       compelling . . . . He may prosecute with ear nestness 
       and vigor - indeed he should do so. But, while he may 
       strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
       ones. 
 
M.A. suffered a brutal attack and rape. By asking the 
jury to factor their understandable sympathy for the victim 
of this horrible crime into deciding Moore's guilt or 
innocence, the prosecutor made an imper missible request 
to decide guilt on something other than the evidence. 
Courts applying Supreme Court precedent have found that 
similar appeals for jurors to decide cases based on passion 
and emotion were improper.20 See supra note 8. But other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. See, e.g., Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247 (1943) 
(prosecutor's statement to jury during W orld War II that "the American 
people are relying upon you . . . for their protection against this sort 
of 
crime, just as much as they are relying upon the men who man the 
guns" was an improper appeal to passion); United States v. Cunningham, 
54 F.3d 295, 300-01 (7th Cir.) (pr osecutor's statement to jury that 
"[c]ollectively you can go back there and stop [the defendants]. You can 
make sure that [the victim] isn't going to get beat up again. Heaven 
forbid, for the witnesses that came in this courtr oom the last couple of 
days if these guys are found not guilty. Heaven forbid. Don't let that 
happen," was improper appeal to jury's emotions), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
883 (1995); United States v. North, 910 F .2d 843, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(prosecutor's statement comparing defendant to Adolf Hitler was 
improper appeal to passion), opinion withdrawn and superseded in part 
on reh'g, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1900) (per curiam order), cert. denied, 
500 U.S. 941 (1991). 
 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Payne , 2 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(prosecutor's reference to defendant taking advantage of children at 
Christmas was improper appeal to emotion); United States v. Lee, 743 
F.2d 1240, 1253 (8th Cir. 1984) (pr osecutor's statement that "[w]hat you 
do as jurors is going to be watched her e. You can better believe that 
each and every drug smuggler is watching what happens here today," 
was an improper appeal to emotion). 
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courts applying Supreme Court precedent have recognized 
that improper appeals to passion can be cur ed.21 Id. 
 
As noted, the trial court here instructed the jury, 
 
       I want to tell you I'm going to order you-- I generally 
       don't order people. I'm going to order you to disregard 
       that last remark made by [the prosecutor] to the effect 
       that the last thing I have to say to you is that if you 
       don't believe her and you think she's lying, then you're 
       probably perpetrating a worse assault on her . 
       Disregard that remark. I have deter mined that's 
       improper and you are not to consider that for any 
       purpose in this case. 
 
Given the graphic evidence of a brutal rape, we believe the 
prosecutor's "perpetrating a worse assault" comment was 
likely to improperly influence the jury's decision by 
implying that a not-guilty verdict would compound M.A.'s 
suffering.22 
 
Furthermore, the prosecutor's ar gument 
mischaracterized M.A.'s testimony. The principal issue at 
trial was never M.A.'s credibility in ter ms of her 
truthfulness or sincerity. In fact, there can be no doubt 
about M.A.'s sincerity. The principal issue was the 
reliability of M.A.'s identification, her opportunity to observe 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. See, e.g., Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(prosecutor's statement asking jurors to put themselves in shoes of 
murder victim's family was not so prejudicial as to deny defendant right 
to fair trial when curative instructions wer e given); Walker v. Gibson, 
228 
F.3d 1217, 1243 (10th Cir. 2000) (pr osecutor's reference to murder 
victim as "cold in his grave" was impr oper appeal to emotion but not 
sufficient to render trial unfair because it was "likely the crime itself 
produced sympathy before [the] pr osecutor made [the] comments"). 
 
22. See, e.g., Kelly, 514 F.2d at 19 (prosecutor's asking jury to "[t]hink 
about the consequences of a letting a guilty man . .. go free. Because 
maybe the next time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of 
the tracks; maybe it will be somebody that you know," operated to deny 
African-American defendant accused of rape the right to fair trial when 
combined with two other inappropriate comments); but see Walker, 228 
F.3d at 1243 (prosecutor's refer ence to murder victim as "cold in his 
grave" was improper appeal to emotion but not sufficient to render trial 
unfair). 
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and remember her assailant. To the extent that implying a 
not-guilty verdict required finding M.A. lied, the prosecutor 
manipulated the identification testimony into a question of 
veracity when the real issue was reliability. To the extent it 
was intended to buttress M.A.'s credibility (in terms of her 
ability to observe or to refute the confabulation argument), 
the argument was improper because it played to the jurors' 
emotions and suggested a not-guilty verdict r equired 
finding M.A. lied. 
 
Were this the only improper ar gument, we do not believe 
Supreme Court precedent would requir e finding a denial of 
due process. Taken in isolation, any pr ejudice stemming 
from the "perpetrating a worse assault" argument could be 
cured with strong instructions like those the trial judge 
issued here. But when viewed in light of the pr osecutor's 
"selection" argument, we believe due pr ocess concerns are 
implicated. Together, the prosecutor's "selection" argument 
and the "perpetrating a worse assault" ar gument were not 
only improper but prejudicial. Thr ough these arguments, 
the prosecutor asked the jury to decide the case on bias 
and emotion rather than on the evidence presented. 
 
Specifically, his "selection" argument asked the jury to 
infer from Mrs. Moore's race, and not fr om the credibility or 
reliability of her alibi testimony, that her husband was 
guilty. As noted by the Supreme Court in Darden, when a 
prosecutor's argument manipulates or misstates the 
evidence, the argument can be so prejudicial as to result in 
the denial of due process. 477 U.S. at 182. Her e, the 
prosecutor manipulated testimony to bolster identification 
evidence. 
 
We believe the trial court properly attempted to cure any 
resulting prejudice from the pr osecutor's arguments. As 
noted, its instructions directly charged the jury to disregard 
the prosecutor's improper refer ences to race and appeals to 
their emotions.23 Despite the trial court's strong 
instructions, the issue remains whether in the context of 
the entire trial and in view of all the evidence, the 
prosecutor's prejudicial remarks r esulted in a denial of due 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. We do not believe the delay occasioned by the overnight adjournment 
is especially relevant here. 
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process. As recognized by the Supr eme Court in Darden, 
when looking at the entire trial, the r eviewing court should 
examine the strength of the evidence against the defendant. 
477 U.S. at 182. 
 
E. 
 
Most of the evidence presented at trial focused on M.A.'s 
identification of Moore. The New Jersey courts found the 
identification evidence "more than sufficient" to support a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Absent the 
prosecutorial misconduct here, we would agree. But 
whether the quantum of evidence against Moor e was 
sufficiently strong to support his conviction in light of the 
prosecutor's prejudicial arguments is a more difficult 
question. 
 
M.A. acknowledged that her eyes were closed during most 
of the attack. She stated that she was only able to see her 
attacker's face at "one point when he was standing over the 
bed." During this "mere glimpse," she was not wearing her 
contact lenses and was understandably extremely 
frightened. The room in which the attack occurr ed was 
dark and was only illuminated by outside str eet lights. M.A. 
stated that although she saw her attacker's face, she could 
not see it "in detail" at the time of the rape. She was only 
able to give a rough physical description of her attacker 
including his race, and his approximate height and physical 
build. It was only after undergoing hypnosis that M.A. was 
able to give a more detailed description of her attacker 
including the clothing he was wearing and the color and 
texture of his hair. The only physical evidence presented at 
trial was the jacket found in Moore's home which M.A. 
identified as the one her attacker wore the night of the 
rape. But the laboratory tests on the fibers on the jacket 
were unhelpful in the identification. 
 
As noted by the Supreme Court in Dar den, improper and 
prejudicial prosecutorial arguments generally are curable 
when the evidence is strong. 477 U.S. at 182. Where the 
evidence is not strong, however, the Court has found that 
highly prejudicial arguments may r esult in the denial of 
due process. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765. As noted, there 
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was no physical evidence here, with the exception of the 
jacket, to connect Moore to the rape. M.A.'s pr e-hypnotic 
identification of her attacker was vague. Her post-hypnotic 
identification was not strong because it was based on her 
recollection of her attacker resulting fr om a single brief 
view. While this evidence could properly support a finding 
of guilt, it is not as strong as those cases in which the 
Supreme Court has found highly prejudicial prosecutorial 
arguments curable. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765; Darden, 477 
U.S. at 182. 
 
In Darden, the Court found the pr osecutor's improper 
arguments curable in part because "the weight of evidence 
against [the defendant] was heavy; the overwhelming 
eyewitness and circumstantial evidence to support a finding 
of guilt on the charges . . . reduced the likelihood that the 
jury's decision was influenced by [the pr osecutor's 
improper] argument." 477 U.S. at 182 (internal quotes 
omitted). Similarly in Greer, the Supreme Court found the 
prosecutor's prejudicial comment about the defendant's 
post-arrest silence did not infect the trial with unfairness 
because the weight of the evidence against the defendant 
was strong. The Greer Court noted the evidence "primarily 
consisting of detailed testimony [of a co-conspirator who 
had confessed to the crime] which was corr oborated by 
physical and other testimonial evidence" was important in 
finding no denial of due process. 483 U.S. at 767. In this 
case, there is no similarly strong physical, circumstantial, 
testimonial, or corroborating identification evidence linking 
Moore to the rape. 
 
F. 
 
Taking into account the prosecutor's highly prejudicial 
comments, the trial judge's curative instructions, and the 
strength of the evidence, we believe a r easonable 
application of Supreme Court precedent r equires finding 
Moore's trial was so infected with unfair ness that it was 
constitutionally infirm. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765; Darden, 
477 U.S. at 182. The Appellate Division impr operly weighed 
the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's references to race 
and his appeals to the jurors' sympathy for the victim in 
light of the strength of the evidence. Although the trial 
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judge issued strong curative instructions, the evidence 
against Moore was not sufficiently str ong to ensure that the 
jury disregarded the prosecutor's inflammatory and highly 
prejudicial arguments and decided the case solely on the 
evidence. A reasonable application of Supr eme Court 
precedent therefore requir es finding Moore's trial was so 
infected with unfairness that he was denied due process. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will r everse the District 
Court's judgment and remand this matter with directions to 
grant the writ of habeas corpus. The State of New Jersey 
may retry Moore. The writ will be issued conditioned upon 
a retrial within 180 days from the date on which the 
District Court enters its order. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join Judge Scirica's opinion, but I write separately to 
note my view that the prosecutor's remarks in his closing 
statement to the jury were not merely, as the Majority 
describes them, "irrelevant, illogical, and offensive." Maj. 
Op. at 29. They were, in fact, outrageous in their direct 
appeal to the jury to decide the case on impr oper grounds 
and abandon the standards that our system of justice 
requires. 
 
The prosecutor's inflammatory remarks clearly were 
calculated to divert the jury from its swor n duty to focus on 
the evidence presented in the case. Indeed, her e the 
prosecutor not only manipulated and misstated the 
evidence, but actually attempted to fabricate evidence that 
did not exist. And in such circumstances, it goes without 
saying that it is the defendant who suf fers harm from the 
prosecutor's misconduct, not the state. Certainly, we 
cannot assume -- as the dissent does -- that given the 
egregious nature of the prosecutor's remarks, the jury 
would automatically recognize the misconduct and 
therefore be more likely to acquit the defendant. Under that 
curious theory, the worse the prosecutorial misconduct, the 
better off the defendant, and the less likely there is to be a 
due process violation. By that reasoning, one is left to 
wonder how prosecutorial misconduct could ever violate 
due process. 
 
Furthermore, it bears emphasis that the curative 
instructions issued by the trial court were mediocre at best, 
and certainly did not cure the prejudicial effect of the 
prosecutor's outrageous remarks. Rather than, as in 
Donnelly, taking "special pains" to corr ect the prosecutor's 
improper remarks, Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 644, here the trial 
judge made no effort to remove the thin veil from the 
prosecutor's racist arguments by telling the jury that these 
arguments were, in fact, improper appeals to racial 
prejudice, and that such appeals should have no bearing 
on the case whatsoever. Moreover , the trial judge never, at 
any time during the trial, used the word "race" in his 
instructions to the jury, and the effect of the prosecutor's 
invidious appeals to racial prejudice, viewed in the context 
of the trial as a whole, could in no way be cur ed by 
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instructions that made no reference to race as a factor that 
the jury must exclude from its deliberations. 
 
Finally, what makes the prejudicial impact of the 
prosecutor's misconduct in this case so clear is that the 
evidence of Clarence Moore's guilt was uniquely 
underwhelming. Judge Scirica's opinion sets forth in detail 
the problems inherent in M.A.'s identification of Moore -- 
which was the only relevant evidence of guilt in the entire 
trial -- and thus I see no need to repeat his excellent 
analysis here. However, I think it is worth noting that the 
use of hypnotically-induced identifications is controversial 
at best, and any concerns that we might have about the 
use of such identifications is heightened in a case such as 
this, where the identification is entir ely uncorroborated. 
E.g., Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(noting that "[c]enturies of experience in the administration 
of justice have shown that convictions based solely on 
testimony that identifies a defendant previously unknown 
to the witness is highly suspect. Of all the various kinds of 
evidence it is the least reliable, especially where 
unsupported by corroborating evidence"); see also United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (observing that 
"[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; 
the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of 
mistaken identification"). 
 
In sum, viewed through the lens of the Supr eme Court's 
teachings on the implications of improper pr osecutorial 
remarks, there is no doubt that Clar ence Moore was denied 
due process. Indeed, when I consider the facts of this case 
-- the egregious prosecutorial misconduct, the lack of 
effective curative instructions, and the insubstantial 
evidence of guilt -- I can hardly imagine a more compelling 
case for reversal given the dictates of established Supreme 
Court precedent. As such, the trial process was infected 
with unfairness, and the New Jersey courts unr easonably 
applied this precedent by not granting Moor e a new trial. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent but do so reluctantly as I recognize 
that the court has made a careful study of this case and 
that it has reached its result only after thoughtful 
deliberation. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the 
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey on 
two occasions went through a similar pr ocess with no less 
an awareness of its obligations and yet r eached a result 
opposite than that the court reaches her e. In the final 
analysis, then, this case involves a choice of two different 
views of the effect of the prosecutor's misconduct and the 
trial court's efforts to remedy the situation. 
 
I do not reiterate the background of this case as the 
court fairly sets it forth. Nor do I discuss the controlling 
legal authorities at length as the court lays them out. 
Rather, I merely state the overar ching legal principles 
involved here. Under the AEDPA when a federal court 
considers a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition, the 
underlying decision of the state court with r espect to any 
claim that was adjudicated on the merits must contr ol 
unless, as germane here, it "was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). Inasmuch as this court 
acknowledges that this case does not implicate the 
"contrary to" prong of section 2254(d)(1), the court must 
determine whether the state decisions wer e an 
unreasonable application of Federal law as determined by 
the Supreme Court. I am satisfied that they were not and, 
in fact, were correct. Indeed, I believe that, if anything, the 
prosecutor's comments which resulted in the admonitions 
and directions of the trial court prejudiced the state at the 
trial. After all, the jury could not possibly have failed to 
recognize that the prosecutor was making an improper 
appeal to it. In this regard, I point out that this is not a 
situation in which the prosecutor suggested to the jury that 
he had important evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt 
which for some reason he had not presented to the jury. 
Thus, while the prosecutor made arguments not supported 
by the evidence they were merely impr oper on the basis of 
the evidence of which the jury was aware. Mor eover, I see 
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no reason to believe that the jury would have had any 
difficulty carrying out the judge's instructions to disregard 
the improper comments. 
 
It is also important to remember that the Appellate 
Division reviewed this matter not once but twice and thus 
the court makes reference to both of its decisions. Actually, 
two separate panels of the Appellate Division consisting of 
five different judges considered this case, once on direct 
appeal and once in post-conviction relief pr oceedings and 
came to the unanimous conclusion that the pr osecutor's 
conduct did not require a reversal of the convictions.1 It 
also is important to recognize that these pr oceedings are 
remedial, not punitive, so that if, as I think is clearly the 
case, the verdict was not influenced by the prosecutor's 
improper remarks, we should deny Moor e relief. 
 
Finally, I point out that under the AEDPA we are in the 
unfamiliar position of being obliged to make a highly 
deferential review of a state court's decisions of law for 
ordinarily our review of legal deter minations is plenary. 
Thus, we must guard against the possibility that our result 
is driven by our mere conclusion that the state court erred 
as the AEDPA requires more for the granting of habeas 
corpus relief. 
 
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Moore contended that his right to a fair trial had been violated in the 
post-conviction relief proceedings as an aspect of an argument that he 
was entitled to a new trial because counsel had been ineffective. 
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